A Carluzzo Rochkind & Smith note: Following is an excellent article by Virginia Lawyers Weekly. We did not handle this case, but it brings up important points your divorce lawyers should be familiar with. For more than 30 years our divorce lawyers in Manassas have helped clients with such matters in Prince William County, Fairfax County, Woodbridge, and throughout Northern Virginia. If you have any questions or would like to schedule an appointment, please contact our law firm at (703) 361-0776.
Husband’s company is marital property worth $800,000
By Virginia Lawyers Weekly – 9/2/2025
Where the circuit court did not err when it found the husband’s company was marital property worth $800,000, its decision was affirmed.
Background
El Mehdi Marhoum argues that the court misapplied Code § 20-107.3 in finding that most of his company, Benel Solutions LLC, was marital property and improperly credited expert testimony that it was worth $800,000. He also claims the court disregarded the equitable-distribution factors, adopted a payment timeline that was impossible to meet and wrongfully awarded wife all her attorney’s fees and costs.
Business
Husband posits three reasons for rejecting the valuation of wife’s expert, Mark Vogel: (1) that Vogel rounded to $800,000 from his calculation of $784,114; (2) that the result was incredible because Vogel did not account for the Economic Injury Disaster Loan, or EIDL, loan and used outdated and “varied” sources and (3) that the valuation date was not current to the evidentiary hearing.
First, despite rounding up, Vogel testified “to a reasonable degree of professional certainty” that Benel’s intrinsic value was $800,000. Husband did not offer evidence to show that rounding up was improper or otherwise violated the applicable standard of care for a valuation expert.
Second, Vogel’s decision not to account for the EIDL loan did not invalidate his valuation because, as Vogel explained, the loan was irrelevant to the income method of valuation. This court has accepted a trial court’s reliance on the “income approach.”
Third, the court rejects husband’s general argument that Vogel relied on “outdated” and “varied” sources. Such quibbles go to the opinion’s weight, not its sufficiency. Vogel testified that his opinion was based on the most recent available information. And Vogel added that husband’s more up-to-date trial testimony had not changed his opinion.
Next, while “the trial court [must] ‘determine the value of any [distributable] property as of the date of the evidentiary hearing on the evaluation issue,’” that does not require a trial court to disregard valuation evidence that predates the hearing. Husband failed to show that the $800,000 valuation was meaningfully outdated.
Marital property
Husband claims that the trial court wrongfully applied Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(e), which makes marital and separate properties entirely marital when they are “commingled into newly acquired property resulting in the loss of identity of the contributing properties.” He argues that the court should have applied subsection (A)(3)(d), instructing that contributed property commingled into receiving property takes on the receiving property’s character. Assuming without deciding that the trial court invoked the wrong subsection, the error was harmless because the court reached the right result.
Once the trial court found that wife met her twin burdens under Code § 20-107.3(A)(3)(a), it was husband’s burden to show any portion of the increase in value that was not marital. But he did not introduce any evidence to show that Benel had a higher value at the time of marriage than when husband bought out his partner’s half share. He did not show that Benel increased in value after the parties separated. Nor did he assign error to the trial court’s finding that he failed to carry his burden on those points.
Next, a trial court must consider the factors enumerated in Code § 20-107.3(E) when equitably distributing marital assets. Husband correctly states that neither the final order nor the court’s bench ruling explicitly references them. But the record shows that the trial court properly considered the factors.
Husband also contends that the trial court “set [him] up to fail and be in contempt of court” by ordering him to pay the entire award about two months after the trial. He claims there was no evidence to show he could meet such a schedule. But the record supports the trial court’s decision rejecting those claims.
Attorneys’ fees
Husband argues that wife failed to prove that all her fees were “necessary.” He also says the court abused its discretion, both in finding that husband contributed to wife’s fees and that husband could afford the large fee award. This court is not persuaded. However the equities do not warrant awarding appellate fees to wife.
Affirmed.
Marhoum v. Fekkak, Record No. 0643-24-4, Aug. 19, 2025. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Raphael). From the Circuit Court of Loudoun County (Fisher). Samuel A. Leven (The Baldwin Law Firm, LLC, on briefs), for appellant. Sonya L. Powell (Monica Sameni; Powell Radomsky, PLLC, on brief), for appellee. VLW 025-7-223. 14 pp.
If you are in need of experienced divorce lawyers who get results, please contact us online or by calling 703-361-0776.
Divorce lawyers in Manassas serving Prince William County, Fairfax County, Woodbridge, and all of Northern Virginia.
