A Carluzzo Rochkind & Smith note: Following is an excellent article by Virginia Lawyers Weekly. We did not handle this case, but it brings up important points your personal injury lawyers should be familiar with. For more than 30 years our personal injury lawyers in Manassas have helped clients with such matters in Prince William County, Fairfax County, Woodbridge, and throughout Northern Virginia. If you have any questions or would like to schedule an appointment, please contact our law firm at (703) 361-0776.
Negligence: Coast Guard prevails in wrongful death suit
By Virginia Lawyers Weekly – 3/31/2025
Where the widow of a man involved in a fatal boat crash sued the Coast Guard over its alleged failure to properly maintain certain navigational aids on a coastal river, the Coast Guard was granted judgment because its decisions involving discretionary functions.
Background
While navigating a coastal river on his way back from a job site, the boat Edward Barnett was driving crashed into a dike located on the side of the river. Both he and his coworker died in the crash. His widow, sued the Coast Guard, alleging that its failure to properly maintain certain navigational aids installed to warn mariners of the dike’s presence caused the crash. However, after a bench trial, the district court ruled for the Coast Guard.
SIAA
Barnett claims that the discretionary function exception to the Suits in Admiralty Act does not apply to the Coast Guard’s choices. Barnett relies on federal regulations to argue that the Coast Guard’s conduct involved mandatory obligations instead of choices and judgments. The court disagrees.
Barnett has failed to show that the Coast Guard’s challenged conduct involves mandatory obligations as opposed to discretionary choices. Indeed, the Coast Guard is permitted to make choices concerning changes to navigational aids. Thus, the Coast Guard’s decisions regarding the brightness, flash sequence and perceptibility of the amber lights and ATONS 49 and 49-A satisfy the requirements of prong one of the discretionary function exception.
However, even if Barnett had satisfied the first requirement, she failed at the second. The second discretionary function exception requirement requires that a plaintiff show “that judgment is [not] of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield, i.e., whether the challenged action is based on considerations of public policy.”
Barnett failed to raise any relevant arguments in her opening brief as to whether the actions or inactions of the Coast Guard that she challenges involve considerations of public policy. “A party waives an argument by failing to present it in its opening brief or by failing to ‘develop its argument—even if its brief takes a passing shot at the issue.’”
However, as the district court correctly held, 33 C.F.R. § 62.21(g) requires the Coast Guard to inform boaters of any known discrepancies and to fix those discrepancies “within a reasonable period of time[.]” Thus, with respect to the inoperable amber light closest to the shore, the Coast Guard did not have discretion regarding whether to timely repair that aid to navigation. For that reason, the court agrees with the district court’s conclusion that the discretionary function exception does not apply to that portion of Barnett’s arguments.
Negligence
Barnett challenges the district court’s analysis of duty and breach under maritime negligence with respect to the one inoperable light. The district court held that since only one of the dike’s lights was not lit, and that light was the amber light closest to the shore, “the dike’s extension into the river was well lit[.]” It also held, relying on Magno v. Corros, 630 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1980), that “[t]he failure of the light furthest from the clearly marked channel would not induce reliance, therefore, there would be no breach of duty.”
Barnett contends that the Coast Guard violated its duty to maintain the lighting system because the lighting system did not adequately “serve as a reasonable warning of the dike’s presence.” Barnett insists that the lighting scheme was “either inoperable, confusing, or imperceptible.”
According to Barnett, the amber lights “were not visible to boaters,” and ATON 49-A should have been equipped with a “quick flashing light” instead of having a “4 second flash rhythm.” Finally, Barnett argues that the district court misapplied Magno because that case involved a plaintiff arguing that more lighting should have been installed, whereas this case involves “operational issues with components of the dike’s existing lighting system.” The court rejects each of Barnett’s arguments.
Proximate cause
Mr. Barnett exited the navigable channel, traveled past the green lateral aids such that they were on the right side of his boat when they should have been on his left, failed to utilize a lookout or his chart plotter—both of which were available to him—and did all of this while traveling at approximately 34 miles an hour at night. The lighting scheme—regardless of its particular features—did not cause him to take those actions. This court thus holds that his actions alone are the sole proximate cause of the allision.
Affirmed.
Barnett v. United States, Case No. 23-2221, March 19, 2025. 4th Cir. (Quattlebaum), from DSC at Charleston (Norton). Jordan Christopher Calloway for Appellant. Anne Murphy for Appellee. VLW 025-2-100. 27 pp.
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