A Carluzzo Rochkind & Smith note: Following is an excellent article by Virginia Lawyers Weekly. We did not handle this case, but it brings up important points your personal injury lawyers should be familiar with. For more than 30 years our personal injury lawyers in Manassas have helped clients with such matters in Prince William County, Fairfax County, Woodbridge, and throughout Northern Virginia. If you have any questions or would like to schedule an appointment, please contact our law firm at (703) 361-0776.
Helicopter pilot killed while crop dusting farm
By Virginia Lawyers Weekly – 7/21/2025
Where a crop dusting pilot was killed when his helicopter collided with a low-hanging steel wire, a jury must decide whether the farm owner, renters or a crop consultant had a duty to warn the pilot or whether the pilot was contributorily negligent.
Background
Eugene Kritter was an experienced helicopter pilot who owned and operated a crop dusting company, Kritter Cropdusting. While crop dusting over a farm in North Carolina, his helicopter collided with a low-hanging steel wire. Kritter was killed in the resulting crash. Kritter Cropdusting and Kritter’s estate brought this negligence case against the owners and operators of the farm and, as well as Nutrien Ag Solutions Inc., the pesticide company that retained Kritter Cropdusting, and its consultant, Jordan Elmore.
The district court held that Murry Rayborn Daw and Daw Farms Inc., who leased Rayborn’s land, owed no duty of care to remove or modify the dove wire or to warn Kritter of its existence. It also concluded that neither Nutrien nor Elmore owed Kritter a duty of care under any theory of liability.
Premises liability
Rayborn and Daw Farms contend that as farmers, not helicopter pilots, they could not reasonably have foreseen the hazard that a dove wire would pose to Kritter in flying his helicopter above their property. Accordingly, they argue they had no legal duty to make the property safe or to warn Kritter about the wire.
Under North Carolina negligence law, however, the issue of foreseeability turns on the particular facts of each case. At summary judgment, it was sufficient for Kritter to put forward evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that, upon exercising reasonable care, Rayborn and Daw Farms “should have foreseen that some injury would result.”
Because Rayborn and Daw Farms were aware of the dove wire and knew that pilots fly low over fields when crop dusting, a jury could reasonably conclude that Rayborn and Daw Farms should have foreseen the danger the dove wire posed to Kritter. On the other hand, the facts before this court do not establish that the danger posed by the dove wire was foreseeable as a matter of law. For this reason, summary judgment is equally inappropriate for Kritter.
Rayborn argues separately that he had no legal duty to Kritter because he had leased his parcel to Daw Farms. North Carolina law provides that where a landowner retains partial control over a leased property, the landowner remains liable for injuries to third parties if the personal injury is caused by conditions under the landowner’s control. At least for summary judgment purposes, it is sufficient that a reasonable jury could conclude that Rayborn would owe a legal duty to Kritter for conditions on the parcel over which he retained control, including the dove wire.
Undertaking liability
Nutrien concedes that Elmore was acting within the scope of his employment with Nutrien at all relevant times. Nutrien is therefore vicariously liable for Elmore’s actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The question is thus whether Elmore owed Kritter a duty of care to warn him about the dove wire.
Elmore worked for Nutrien as a crop consultant. He hired Kritter to crop dust Daw Farms’s fields. In carrying out this task, Elmore was under an obligation to exercise the “ability, skill, and care customarily used” by crop consultants when engaging a pilot to crop dust fields. A jury could reasonably conclude that Elmore had a legal duty to warn Kritter of reasonably foreseeable hazards. A question of fact also remains as to whether the risk posed by the dove wire was reasonably foreseeable to Elmore.
Appellees’ contentions
Based on the facts before the district court, a reasonable jury could well conclude that Kritter was contributorily negligent. Indeed, Kritter was aware of the deer stand pole, and a jury could reasonably infer that the presence of the dove wire would have been obvious. That is a factual determination, however.
Appellees finally contend that Kritter’s negligence claim fails because the crash resulted from a danger that was incident to work Kritter had undertaken as an independent contractor. This argument misapprehends North Carolina law.
Vacated and remanded.
Kritter v. Mooring, Case No. 24-1158, July 8, 2025 (on rehearing). 4th Cir. (Berner), from EDNC at Raleigh (Myers II). John Chilson for Appellants. Walter E. Brock Jr. and Benjamin James Hogan for Appellees. VLW 025-2-250. 17 pp.
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