A Carluzzo Rochkind & Smith note: Following is an excellent article by Virginia Lawyers Weekly. We did not handle this case, but it brings up important points your personal injury lawyers should be familiar with. For more than 30 years our personal injury lawyers in Manassas have helped clients with such matters in Prince William County, Fairfax County, Woodbridge, and throughout Northern Virginia. If you have any questions or would like to schedule an appointment, please contact our law firm at (703) 361-0776.
Negligence: Victim’s negligence suit survives motion to dismiss
By Virginia Lawyers Weekly – 8/23/2024
Where a man filed suit against two parties involved in a multi-car accident, and one of the parties argued she was not negligent, but the complaint plausibly alleged both parties were negligent, the motion was denied.
Background
As alleged in the amended complaint, on Dec. 15, 2020, a car being driven by Ingrid Lisseth Parada Mendoza struck a car being driven by Madison Taylor Thiel. As a result, Ms. Mendoza’s vehicle collided with the rear end of Ms. Thiel’s car before careening across the opposing lane of traffic, striking a vehicle being driven by Samuel Frempong.
Mr. Frempong filed an action asserting negligence claims against Ms. Mendoza and Ms. Thiel. The United States substituted itself in place of Ms. Thiel as a defendant. Mr. Frempong then filed an amended complaint, asserting claims for: (1) negligence as to Ms. Mendoza (Count One); (2) negligence as to the United States (Count Two) and (3) joint and several negligence as to both defendants (Count Three).
Ms. Mendoza filed a crossclaim against the United States, seeking a judgment for contribution in the event that Mr. Frempong is awarded any damages from her. The United States has filed a partial motion to dismiss Counts Two and Three of the amended complaint, and the crossclaim.
Negligence claims
The United States first asserts that the negligence claims in Counts Two and Three of the amended complaint should be dismissed because Mr. Frempong fails to plausibly state that Ms. Thiel caused his injuries. The United States argues that plaintiff has, at most, pleaded a prima facie case of negligence against Ms. Mendoza (and not Ms. Thiel) because Ms. Mendoza became a superseding cause of the car accident when she rear-ended Ms. Thiel.
The alleged facts, taken as true, plausibly suggest that Ms. Thiel acted negligently. As drivers operating their vehicles on the same road, Ms. Thiel and Ms. Mendoza owed duties of care to each other. Ms. Thiel allegedly came to a sudden stop in front of Ms. Mendoza without signaling when she knew or should have known that a closely following vehicle was moving at an excessive speed. Meanwhile, Ms. Mendoza allegedly failed to fully pay attention when she should have been on the lookout for any dangers on the road, including suddenly stopping vehicles.
These independent breaches of duty together form a natural sequence of events that plausibly contributed to Mr. Frempong’s injuries. Importantly, neither Ms. Thiel’s nor Ms. Mendoza’s actions, viewed in context, were sufficiently disconnected from each other to the point that they could be considered superseding causes. Even assuming that Ms. Mendoza was following closely behind Ms. Thiel and not fully paying attention, there would have been more time for her to react to Ms. Thiel making a right turn had Ms. Thiel not suddenly stopped without signaling. As a result, a reasonable inference can be made that both Ms. Thiel and Ms. Mendoza were independent proximate causes of Mr. Frempong’s injuries. Therefore, this court finds that Counts Two and Three of the amended complaint sufficiently allege Ms. Thiel’s negligence at this juncture.
Crossclaim
The United States next argues that Ms. Mendoza’s crossclaim seeking contribution should be dismissed because Mr. Frempong has failed to state a plausible underlying negligence claim against Ms. Thiel. This claim fails for the same reason as the United States’ first motion to dismiss.
The court has already concluded that Mr. Frempong’s amended complaint states a plausible negligence claim against Ms. Thiel. It thus follows that Ms. Mendoza has a plausible contribution claim in the event that Mr. Frempong obtains a judgment against Ms. Mendoza. Accordingly, the court will permit the crossclaim to move past the motion to dismiss stage.
Defendant’s partial motion to dismiss amended complaint denied. Defendant’s motion to dismiss crossclaim denied.
Frempong v. Thiel, Case No. 1:23-cv-1592, Aug. 8, 2024. EDVA at Alexandria (Alston). VLW 024-3-406. 8 pp.
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