A Carluzzo Rochkind & Smith note: Following is an excellent article by Virginia Lawyers Weekly. We did not handle this case, but it brings up important points your personal injury lawyers should be familiar with. For more than 30 years our personal injury lawyers in Manassas have helped clients with such matters in Prince William County, Fairfax County, Woodbridge, and throughout Northern Virginia. If you have any questions or would like to schedule an appointment, please contact our law firm at (703) 361-0776.
Trial court erred when it set aside $500,000 jury verdict
By Virginia Lawyers Weekly – 11/3/2025
Where a jury found a firefighter was grossly negligent when he collided with a vehicle, the circuit court erred when it set aside that verdict. The evidence did not conclusively establish the firefighter exercised any care to prevent the accident.
Background
James Lee sued Jason Carr, a city firefighter, for ordinary and gross negligence arising from a motor vehicle accident. The trial court ruled that sovereign immunity barred Lee’s ordinary negligence claim. A jury returned a $500,000 verdict for Lee on his gross negligence claim. The trial court later set aside the jury’s verdict.
Immunity
Lee contends that the trial court erred by ruling that sovereign immunity barred his ordinary negligence claim. Lee asks this court to reverse the trial court’s finding that Carr “exercised his judgment and discretion in choosing to proceed expeditiously through the intersection.”
The record reflects that the trial court received evidence at the plea hearing and found, based on that evidence, Carr exercised his judgment and discretion. Yet the record does not include a transcript of the hearing or a written statement of facts in lieu of a transcript, so this court cannot determine whether the trial court’s factual finding was plainly wrong or without evidence to support it as Lee contends.
Liability
Lee contends that the trial court erred by setting aside the jury’s verdict because the evidence did not conclusively establish that Carr exercised any care to prevent the accident. The court agrees.
The trial court identified five acts of care that it found Carr took to prevent the accident: (1) Carr used the engine retarder to slow Rescue 1, (2) Carr kept “a lookout” when approaching the intersection, (3) Carr braked “towards the very end of the incident,” (4) Carr activated the siren and (5) Carr activated the lights. Yet the evidence about the first four acts of care was in conflict.
The only uncontroverted evidence of a potential act of care was Carr’s activation of lights, which Lee concedes were on. Lee argues, however, that lights were “not relevant” as a “warning device” because Carr knew the intersection was obstructed and that the lights would not have been visible to southbound traffic on Ivy Avenue. The court agrees.
The grossly negligent act in this case was Carr’s decision to drive through a traffic light-controlled intersection at a rate of speed above the posted speed limit despite his inability to see traffic that had the right of way. Therefore, the issue before the trial court when determining whether to set aside the jury’s verdict was whether Carr exercised slight diligence or scant care in proceeding with his action.
Carr explained that the purpose of lights was “[t]o announce that we’re coming through or that we’re in their way and that we’re asking for right of way.” But Carr knew that lights were not visible to southbound traffic on Ivy Avenue. It follows that Carr did not exercise any care for the duty he owed to those traveling southbound on Ivy Avenue by turning on lights because motorists, like Lee, could not have seen them in time to yield the right of way. The question of whether Carr exercised any care was a factual one for the jury and credible evidence supports its verdict.
Dr. Wardell’s testimony
Carr assigns cross-error to the trial court’s ruling excluding Dr. Wardell’s deposition testimony. The court agrees.
Dr. Wardell testified that he had asked Lee to execute a contract assigning an interest in proceeds that Lee received “from this case” and that Lee agreed to do so. In other words, Dr. Wardell conceded that he had a financial interest in the outcome of this case.
Lee insists that his assignment of proceeds “would necessarily improperly inject insurance before the jury” based on its terms. Yet Lee also acknowledges that a copy of the assignment is not included in the record. Moreover, Dr. Wardell’s testimony does not, on its face, force Lee to testify regarding his insurance coverage.
Had Carr been allowed to introduce Dr. Wardell’s testimony showing his financial interest in the outcome, the jury may have discounted Dr. Wardell’s testimony and reduced its award of damages. Therefore, the trial court’s error was not harmless, and the court vacates the jury’s award of damages.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Concurring/dissenting opinion
Malveaux, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority’s holdings with respect to the erroneous exclusion of Dr. Wardell’s testimony and Lee’s waiver of the sovereign immunity issue. But I disagree with its holding that the circuit court erred by setting aside the jury’s verdict as to Carr’s liability for gross negligence.
Lee v. Carr, Record No. 0990-24-1, Oct. 21, 2025. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Petty). From the Circuit Court of City of Newport News (Papile). W. Mark Broadwell (Broadwell Law, on briefs), for appellant. Philip L. Bradfield, Deputy City Attorney, for appellee. VLW 025-7-302. 18 pp.
If you are in need of experienced personal injury lawyers who get results, please contact us online or by calling 703-361-0776.
Personal injury lawyers in Manassas serving Prince William County, Fairfax County, Woodbridge, and all of Northern Virginia.
