A Carluzzo Rochkind & Smith note: Following is an excellent article by Virginia Lawyers Weekly. We did not handle this case, but it brings up important points your personal injury lawyers should be familiar with. For more than 30 years our personal injury lawyers in Manassas have helped clients with such matters in Prince William County, Fairfax County, Woodbridge, and throughout Northern Virginia. If you have any questions or would like to schedule an appointment, please contact our law firm at (703) 361-0776.
Negligence: Woman fails to show negligent construction caused accident
By Virginia Lawyers Weekly – 12/16/2024
Where a woman alleged that two companies negligently created a dangerous temporary on-ramp to Interstate 95 South that proximately caused a car collision in which she was injured, the companies were entitled to introduce evidence that another’s negligence was the sole proximate or superseding cause of her injuries.
Background
Stephanie K. Blanchard appeals the circuit court’s order granting judgment in favor of Richmond Traffic Control Inc., or RTC, and Shirley Contracting Company LLC, following a jury verdict for RTC and Shirley in Blanchard’s personal injury suit against them. Blanchard asserts that the circuit court erred by denying her motion in limine to prohibit RTC and Shirley from “blaming” nonparties for the collision that caused her injuries. Blanchard also argues that the circuit court erred in giving four jury instructions over her objection and refusing her request for four other jury instructions.
Causation
Blanchard argues that evidence of nonparty negligence was “irrelevant unless there might be a superseding cause.” That argument presumes that the evidence would establish that RTC and Shirley were negligent as a matter of law.
RTC and Shirley disputed their negligence, and they were entitled to introduce evidence that another’s negligence was the sole proximate or superseding cause of Blanchard’s injuries. RTC and Shirley argued that evidence of third-party negligence would support a finding that Kasey’s or Ramirez’s negligence was the sole proximate or superseding cause of the collision. With that disputed factual issue unresolved, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by permitting RTC and Shirley to introduce evidence supporting their defense.
The evidence shows no concurrent action, but rather a clear sequence of events. First, RTC and Shirley set up the construction zone which, according to multiple individuals who reviewed it, complied with relevant standards of care. Then, at a later point in time, Kasey drove through it. Passing a portable message warning of the changed traffic pattern and a yield sign, Kasey “merge[d] immediately” even though he was “confused” and disoriented by the surrounding bright lights.
Finally, Ramirez, driving past the construction zone, struck Kasey’s vehicle from behind. Reasonable persons could conclude, based on Kasey’s testimony, that Kasey and/or Ramirez—without any contributing negligence by RTC and Shirley—caused the collision. RTC and Shirley were entitled to put on evidence showing that Kasey’s or Ramirez’s actions in or around the construction zone superseded any of their own negligence that occurred earlier, while they were setting it up.
Jury instructions
Blanchard’s proposed instruction deals with the foreseeability of injury from a highway contractor’s negligent act. A jury instruction on foreseeable consequences “is appropriate where a defendant has breached a duty owed to a plaintiff resulting in an unanticipated injury.” Here, the issue at trial was not the foreseeability of Blanchard’s injuries, but rather whose negligence caused the collision. Under these circumstances, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying this instruction.
Blanchard’s special instructions merely restate the legal principles set forth in the circuit court’s given instructions, but using relevant nouns such as “contractors” and “lane closures” where the given instructions use more general terms such as “defendants” and “ordinary care.” Where there are other instructions covering the same principles, such instructions “inappropriately ‘single out for emphasis a part of the evidence tending to establish a particular fact,’ and ‘would be confusing or misleading to the jury.’”
Moreover, one of the special instructions distinguishes between superseding and intervening cause, but RTC and Shirley’s theory of their defense was superseding cause only. Adding the definition of “intervening cause” to the already large quantity of legal concepts the jury was required to absorb, where no party had raised the issue of intervening cause, would have run the risk of confusing the jury.
Blanchard concedes that given instructions 20, 21, 22 and 23 are accurate statements of law, but she argues they “neither fully nor fairly explain the law of the case.” The court disagrees. These instructions clearly stated the law and covered all issues the evidence fairly raised.
Affirmed.
Blanchard v. Richmond Traffic Control Inc., Record No. 1871-23-2, Dec. 3, 2024. CAV (unpublished opinion) (Malveaux). From the Circuit Court of the City of Fredericksburg (Willis). Christopher T. Holinger (Adam H. Lotkin; Georgina Montgomery; Davis Law, PLC; Rutter Mills LLP, on briefs), for appellant. James L. Hoyle (James H. Revere, III; Christopher J. Flynn; Kalbaugh, Pfund & Messersmith, P.C., on brief), for appellee Richmond Traffic Control, Inc. (Joseph W. Santini; Morris Kletzkin; Friedlander Misler, PLLC, on brief), for appellee Shirley Contracting Company, LLC. VLW 024-7-359. 13 pp.
If you are in need of experienced personal injury lawyers who get results, please contact us online or by calling 703-361-0776.
Personal injury lawyers in Manassas serving Prince William County, Fairfax County, Woodbridge, and all of Northern Virginia.
